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DEREGULATION AND THE PRACTICING
ATTORNEY
HERBERT

D.

KELLEHER*

W

ITHIN the next month Congress will probably enact legislation substantially changing federal economic regulation
of the domestic air transport industry for the first time since such
regulation was imposed in 1938. While there is still considerable
debate concerning the substance and form of the final bill, some
measure of regulatory reform appears inevitable. All the available
economic evidence demonstrates that the artificial suppression of
competitive market forces by predecessors to the present Civil Aeronautics Board, acting within the latitude afforded by the Federal
Aviation Act, has encouraged unnecessarily high fares; carrier
inefficiency; excess capacity; undue concentration in the industry;
and has denied passengers a choice of price and service options
that would be available to them in a less regulated environment!
The popular term for reform proposals--"deregulation"-is
actually somewhat of a misnomer. What is contemplated by the
proponents of regulatory change is basically a redirection of government policy toward allowing greater competition through partial relaxation of entry and pricing controls. Deregulation, i.e.,
the immediate abolition of all restraints on entry and pricing, unfortunately does not appear to be "in the cards."
The purpose of this article is to survey the history of the existing regulatory scheme, the reasons for the present impetus for
reform, and the major arguments for and against amending the
1938 Act (as carried over into the 1958 Act). Finally, some com*B.A., Wesleyan University (1953); LL.B., New York University (1956).
Partner, Oppenheimer,

Rosenberg, Kelleher & Wheatley,

Inc., San
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Chairman of the Board and General Counsel, Southwest Airlines Co. Grateful
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'The present CAB, under the leadership of Chairman Alfred Kahn, has been
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ments will be offered on the possible impact of regulatory change
on matters such as airline safety, airport financing, administrative
law, and consumer protection which may be of particular interest
to the practicing attorney not directly involved in the controversy.
Originsof the CAB and Economic Regulation
Federal economic regulation of the airline industry originated
during the New Deal, and the essential statutory basis for CAB
authority has not changed since the adoption of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.' Congress altered the regulatory framework
somewhat in 1958 when it separated safety regulation from economic regulation. The new statute, the Federal Aviation Act of
1958,' transferred safety functions to an independent agency, the
Federal Aviation Agency (now reorganized as the Federal Aviation Administration), but it carried forward unchanged the sections of the 1938 statute dealing with economic regulation.
At the time federal economic regulation was first considered,
the principal business of commercial aviation was not passenger
service, but the transportation of mail. Most airlines believed that
they could not afford to operate substantial routes without a subsidized mail contract. However, neither the government nor the airline industry was satisfied with the manner in which mail contracts
were awarded and administered. In 1934, Postmaster General
Farley cancelled all existing contracts, charging the airlines with
collusion in the competitive bidding process when the routes had
been awarded earlier by the Hoover Administration. For a brief
period, Army pilots carried the mail, but their operations were
plagued by numerous accidents, and new legislation returned mail
transportation to private carriers under a revised competitive bidding process. Three separate agencies supervised the carriers at
promoting competition by expediting and favorably considering new route applications and reduced fare proposals. This contrasts starkly with a new route "moratorium" imposed by the CAB some years ago. The mere fact that widely diver-

gent attitudes and decisions on "competition" are reachable under the same statutory guidelines argues that Congress must reform and refine the Federal Aviation
Act if it, and not the agency, is to control policies respecting the economic aspects of domestic aviation. Ironically, the anticipated regulatory reform bill may
well embody less pricing flexibility and more route protection than is available
under the recently inaugurated administrative policies of the Kahn CAB.
2Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 706, 52 Stat. 973.
' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1301
et seq. (1976), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.

1978]

DEREGULATION

the time: the Post Office Department awarded mail contracts and
determined the routes and schedules to be flown; the Interstate
Commerce Commission set rates for mail pay; and a bureau in the
Commerce Department regulated safety. Part of the impetus behind the 1938 Act was therefore a desire to rationalize the regulation of mail contracts and combine the functions of the three
agencies in a single body."
The principal purposes of the resulting legislation, however,
were to control the degree of competition in the industry and thus
to provide route security for the existing carriers.' By the late
1930's, many airlines were in serious financial difficulty; some were
on the verge of bankruptcy. Although their economic problems
were due in large part to absurdly low competitive bids for mail
carriage, substantial startup costs, and a general downturn in business conditions during the Depression, the contract carriers blamed
"destructive competition" from smaller carriers. As a Congressional
committee was to observe twenty years later:
The scheduled air mail carriers were haunted by visions of a
mass invasion of unsubsidized operators, flying secondhand equipment and employing flying personnel at wages less than the minimum statutorily prescribed for air mail carriers. With their lower
costs and their utilization of the pioneering efforts of their air mail
predecessors, the newcomers, it was feared, might provide a lowcost service which would attract substantial patronage from the
established, subsidized airlines. The new service, while safe, would
be "inferior" to the existing service because it would be less modem and less reliable. But the new entrants, and the cutthroat competition which was to be their hallmark, clearly were more of a
threat than a reality. While there was some price competition
among the established carriers, the sorry financial plight of the
airlines had not been caused by the "irresponsible" and "scatterbrained" unsubsidized competitors which the new legislation was
4 The background to adoption of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and the
statute's legislative history are treated extensively in C. RHYNE, THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT ANNOTATED

(1939); L.

KEYES,

FEDERAL CONTROL

OF ENTRY

IN

(1951) [hereinafter cited as KEYES]; Report of the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on Airlines, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1957) reprinted in W. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REGULATED
INDUSTRIES 727-732 (1967); and Westwood and Bennett, A Footnote to the
Legislative History of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Afterward, 42
NoTRE DAME LAW. 309 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Westwood and Bennett].
ISee CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961).
AIR TRANSPPORTATION
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designed to exclude, for in fact there were virtually no such operators in existence in 1938.'
Nevertheless, the established carriers argued that unless uncontrolled entry and "overcompetition" were curbed, they would be
unable to attract the capital necessary to survive, thereby threatening the existence of the entire air transportation system.
In 1936, the major carriers formed a trade association-the
Air Transport Association (ATA)-whose officers decided the
industry needed a protective statute similar to the Interstate Commerce Act. Several of the bills first considered by Congress in
fact provide for regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), although they were abandoned in favor of proposals
to create an independent agency concerned only with aviation.
Sponsors of the proposed legislation analogized the airlines to
railroads and other industries traditionally regarded as "natural
monopolies," despite the fact that airlines did not operate on
tracks or utilize power lines and, indeed, had a much different
pattern of costs and operating practices. The bill, which eventually
became the Civil Aeronautics Act (drafted initially by counsel
for the ICC, ATA, and the major airlines),' borrowed heavily from
the railroad and motor carrier sections of the Interstate Commerce
Act. Senator Pat McCarran and Congressman Clarence F. Lea,
major proponents of the legislation in Congress, apparently regarded the requirement of a certificate of public convenience and
necessity in the Interstate Commerce Act as reason in itself for
imposing such a requirement on airlines, thus furnishing "an outstanding example of how institutional history fixes an idea which
in turn becomes determinative of future policy."'
The committee hearings, reports, and floor debates in both
houses were filled with denunciations of "cutthroat competition,"
"chaos," and "destructive tactics" in the industry, predictions of
"rate wars," and pleas for route protection so that the financial
position of the established carriers and the entire air transport
' Report of the Antitrust Subcommittee, supra note 4, at 736.
7
J. GOULD, THE SUPER LAWYERS 33-34 (1972); Regulation of the Carriage
of Passenger and Property by Aircraft, Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 515 (1937). See also Westwood and Bennett, supra note 4, at 329.
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system would not collapse.9 Congressman Lea told his colleagues in
the House of Representatives:
One hundred and twenty million dollars has already been invested in commercial aviation in the United States. It is the information of the committee that $60,000,000 of this sum has been
wiped out. The fact that so much money has been put into commercial aviation shows the faith, the genius, and the courage of
the American people in that they are willing to invest as they have
in aviation up to this date. However, in the absence of legislation
such as we have now before us, these lines are going to find it very
difficult if not impossible to finance their operations because of the
lack of stability and assurance in their operations. You would not
want to invest $200 to $2,000 a mile in a line that has no assurance of security of its route and no protection against cutthroat
competition.
Part of the proposal here is that the regulatory body created by
the bill will have authority to issue certificates of convenience and
necessity to the operators. This will give assurance of security of
route. The authority will also exercise rate control, requiring that
rates be reasonable and giving power to protect against cutthroat
competition. In my judgment, those two things are the fundamental
and essential needs of aviation at this time, security and stability
in the route and protection against cutthroat competition.
These are the two economic fundamentals presented and it is
this necessity that the bill seeks to meet. We want to give financial
stability to these companies so they can finance their operations
and finance them to advantage. 10
The industry's pleas for controls on entry and price competition
simply repeated a pattern recurring throughout the history of
economic regulation in the United States. In the late nineteenth
century, the railroads supported the Interstate Commerce Act as
a device for protecting their market position. Large truckers and
barge operators used similar arguments to limit price competition
and obtain route protection in the 1930's. The legislative history
of the Civil Aeronautics Act simply comports with one of the
major theories of economic regulation: that, as a rule, restrictive
legislation is secured by the affected industry and is designed and
administered primarily for its benefit." The fact that regulation by
IH.R. Rep. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); Sen. Rep. No. 1661, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
1083 CONG. REc. 6406-6407 (1938).

", Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. SCI.
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the CAB has produced only mixed benefits for the airline industry
does not defeat the hypothesis.
Although the principal impetus for creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board was the industry's desire for protection and financial
stability, other factors were at work which have often been overlooked in discussions of the Act's legislative history. Aviation was
an infant but technologically significant industry, and many congressional proponents of the Act believed the government should
take steps to promote its "orderly development." More important,
passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act was undoubtedly influenced
by the general pessimism about free enterprise and the faith in
government controls which accompanied much New Deal legislation. This profound mistrust of competition played a significant
role in the extension of regulation to a number of other naturally
competitive industries and in the creation of such agencies as the
National Recovery Administration. As Richard Posner has observed, government supervision was promoted because the "Great
Depression seemed to many to reveal the bankruptcy of the market
as an economic regulator," despite the fact that it was "primarily
the inadequacy of [government] fiscal, monetary and welfare policy
that made the depression so painful and prolonged."'" Finally, creation of the CAB was founded on assumptions that the airline industry was a business "affected with the public interest" and that
any business affected with the public interest should be subject to
public utility controls."2
All of these influences merged to result in passage of the Civil
Aeronautics Act in June 1938. "If not united with one another as
to the cause for concern, the proponents of more comprehensive
3 (1971). George Stigler argues that in seeking economic regulation, an industry
strives for four principal contributions from the government: a direct subsidy of
money; control over entry by new firms; powers affecting substitutes or complements (e.g., federal aid for airport construction); and price fixing. All four such
elements have been present, at one time or another, in the policies advocated by

the airlines.
12Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548,
621-622 (1969).
" REDFORD, supra note 8, at 32. It is suspected that the financial institutions
which dominated the infant American airline industry also may have played a

significant role in shaping the legislation which emerged. Unlike traditional utility
legislation, the 1938 Act and its 1958 successor do not give the CAB any direct

control over such matters as airline financing and equipment and facilities acquisition and disposal.
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air carrier regulation at least found unity in their fear of an uncharted future."1 The fragmented basis for Congressional support
of the Act is reflected in the unusual policy statement contained
in Section 102:"5
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under
this chapter, the Board shall consider the following among other
things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the
public convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of
the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the
United States Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in,
such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and
coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without injust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to
the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the United States Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics."
The Board not only is to regulate, but it also is to "promote,"
"encourage," and "develop" commercial aviation. It is also to foster
"(c)ompetition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation system"--a provision not contained in any previous regulatory statute. The six objectives quoted
above are both ambiguous and contradictory. As Richard Caves
has noted: "Taken literally, [they require] an impossibility by
suggesting the simultaneous maximization of things that probably
14Jones, Licensing of Domestic Air Transportation, Part 1, 30 J. AIR L. &

COM. 113, 115 (1965).
5
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
16 Id.
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cannot be simultaneously maximized."" More realistically, the
Declaration of Policy gives the Board "sufficiently broad discretion
that any one of a wide variety of results is either legally justifiable
or at least not subject to meaningful judicial review."'"
The Act created a five-member independent agency known as
the Civil Aeronautics Authority (later renamed the Civil Aeronautics Board) and gave it the power (a) to control entry into
interstate and foreign commerce by requiring entrants to obtain
certificates of public convenience and necessity prescribed by the
agency; (b) to control exits by requiring approval before abandoning a route or ceasing service to a point; (c) to exempt carriers
from certain provisions of the Act; (d) to regulate fares on the
basis of rate-making provisions adopted from sections of the Interstate Commerce Act; (e) to award direct subsidies to air carriers;
(f) to control mergers and intercarrier agreements, thus immunizing them from the antitrust laws; and (g) to investigate deceptive
trade practices and unfair methods of competition."9 A bureau
within the Authority was also given authority to regulate safety
of all civil aviation, both private and commercial. And under a
grandfather clause, the Board was directed to issue certificates
of public convenience and necessity to the sixteen established airlines operating scheduled service. As one writer has described it:
The resulting Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 gave the airlines
almost all they desired. The routes of the then existing ... airlines
were protected, and the threat of outside competition was practically eliminated. Furthermore, a generous subsidy was provided,
in effect a blank check. The carriage of Air Mail need no longer be
on a contract basis, subject to competitive bids. Instead, government mail pay was to be awarded to a carrier on the basis of
"need." Unless a carrier could be shown to be willfully fraudulent
or inefficient in his management, he no longer had to fear losses.
The government stood ready not only to make up any deficit, but
'1R.

CAVES,

AiR

TRANSPORT AND

ITS REGULATORS

127 (1962)

[hereinafter

cited as CAVES]. Moreover, even if one believes in the efficacy of economic regulation of naturally competitive industries, the CAB was not given the requisite
"'tools" to do this job, as it was deprived of control over schedules, financing,
and equipment acquisition and disposal.
18 Jones, Licensing of Domestic Air Transportation, Part H, 31 J. AIR L. &
COM. 89, 91 (1965). See also United Air Lines v. CAB, 371 F.2d 221, 224 (7th
Cir. 1967); Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 439 F.2d 634, 637 n.4 (1971).
1049 U.S.C. §
1371-1387 (1976).
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also to insure a return on his investment. All in all, the Act seemed
to be a bonanza for the airlines, and the major figures in the industry greeted its passage enthusiastically."
Life Under the 1938 Act
During its forty year existence, the Civil Aeronautics Board
has, on the whole, faithfully and competently carried out its vision
of the basic statutory directives of the 1938 Act. It has succeeded
in expanding scheduled service to every city of appreciable size
in the United States, encouraged route and service competition
among the existing carriers, and promoted the growth of the industry. With few exceptions, the defects in the present regulatory
scheme are not the result of erroneous Board policy, but are instead inevitable products of the Act itself and the Board's difficulties in reconciling the conflicting mandates imposed on it by
Congress.
One of the most obvious products of life under the statute has
been the total exclusion of new entrants into domestic trunkline
service. Although the Board received more than seventy-nine applications for trunkline authority from outsiders between 1950
and 1974, it did not approve one of them." The most apparent
reason for its refusal to do so has been the inherent tendency of
the certification process to favor the past operating performance
of existing carriers, rather than any bias or express policy of exclusion on the part of the CAB.2 The Board has authorized new
entry by additional categories of carriers, permitting them to provide "specialized" types of service. Yet none has been allowed to
compete with the trunklines on dense long-haul routes between
major cities. After World War II, the Board authorized a group
of "local service" carriers to provide subsidized feeder service to
small communities on an experimental basis; in 1955 their certificates were made permanent by statute and they are now known
as "regional" airlines. The Board has also granted authority to
classes of carriers providing supplemental (or charter) service, all20

KELLY, THE SKY'S THE LIMIT

102 (1963).

Airline Regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board, Summary of Report of
the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, reprinted in
2"

41 J. Am L. & COM. 607, 614 (1975).
22

1975)

REPORT OF THE CAB

SPECIAL STAFF ON REGULATORY

[hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE

CAB

REFORM 49

SPECIAL STAFF].

(July
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cargo service, metropolitan helicopter service, and service within
Alaska and Hawaii. It has also established a category of carriers
exempt from economic regulation under Part 298 of the Board's
Rules-air taxi or commuter operators utilizing aircraft with a
maximum seating capacity of thirty and payload of 7,500 pounds.
Richard Caves, in his classic study of air transportation, suggested that "a new carrier will never be picked to supply a standard
(trunkline) service, but will always be chosen for a completely
novel and risky one." 3 This tendency apparently results from the
Board's desire to use route awards as a vehicle for improving the
profitability of existing carriers or to reduce the disparity in size
among them. In instances in which a new applicant proposes an
innovative service which threatens an existing carrier with serious
competition, the Board always has struggled with the problem until
it found a way to resolve it in favor of the established carrier.
This has occurred on a number of occasions, most prominently
in the attempts by nonscheduled carriers to obtain authority to
provide low-cost scheduled service in competition with the trunks.
Immediately after World War H a number of nonscheduled airlines entered the industry under a general exemption granted previously by the CAB, using surplus transport aircraft available at
the end of the war.' Several made application for scheduled
authority to provide low cost coach service-a class of passenger
service not then offered by any of the trunks. In rejecting the
applications, the Board admitted that "the extension of low-fare,
or coach transportation would bring into existence an additional
market, a substantial part of which would be made up of persons
who previously have not traveled by air," but it concluded that
awarding the "nonskeds" route authority was still not justified. The
market for transcontinental air coach service should be reserved for
eventual penetration by the certificated incumbents in order to
produce excess revenues for support of coach service on their
weaker routes. "We cannot escape the conclusion ... that the introduction of new carriers, operating unlimited air coach services
note 17, at 171.
For a discussion of the Board's treatment of the nonscheduled carriers, see
CAvEs, supra note 17, at 171-174, 272-279; and Maclay & Burt, Entry of New
" CAvEs, supra
24

Carriers into Domestic Trunkline Air Transportation, 22 J. AIR L. & CoM. 131
(1955).
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as here proposed, would constitute a serious threat to the future
orderly progression toward cheaper air transportation for the
Nation as a whole."'
In 1967, World Airways, another nonscheduled airline (regulated by the Board as a supplemental carrier), applied for a
certificate to provide regular transcontinental service between
major cities on the East and West coasts at fares as low as $79.
The CAB "sat" on World's application for several years and
then dismissed it as "stale."' When World refiled in a supposedly
more "hospitable" atmosphere, the CAB used various procedural
devices to avoid dealing with the application and eventually again
dismissed it on the erroneous ground that the Act prevented a
supplemental carrier from holding scheduled authority. '
Besides being identified as a closed market, the domestic industry is also characterized by its concentration. Although forty years
have elapsed since they were granted grandfather rights in 1938,
the trunklines (now reduced from sixteen to ten through mergers)
today carry approximately eighty-eight percent of the domestic
passenger market."8 The Board has attempted to reduce the size
variance between the trunks through additional route awards to
smaller carriers; nevertheless, the four companies which dominated
the domestic industry in 1938-American Airlines, United Air
Lines, Transcontinental & Western Air (now TWA), and Eastern
Air Lines-still remain the "Big Four."' The local service industry, now composed of nine regional airlines, ' has been permitted
to compete with the trunks on a number of short- and mediumhaul routes; still it accounts for less than nine percent of the
domestic market. Such concentration is not a natural product of
the air transport industry, since the available evidence suggests
that the optimum size of an airline is certainly no greater than that
2 Transcontinental Coach-Type Service Case, 14 C.A.B. 720, 724 (1951).
16CAB Order No. 73-11-101 (Nov. 21, 1973).
2' The Board was reversed in World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 547 F.2d 695
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
21 CAB AIR CARRIER TRAFFIc STATISTICS (1938-1977).
22 The other six are Braniff Airways, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines,
National Airlines, Northwest Orient Airlines, and Western Airlines.
" Air New England, Allegheny Airlines, Frontier Airlines, Hughes Airwest,
North Central Airlines, Ozark Airlines, Piedmont Airlines, Southern Airways,
and Texas International Airlines.
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of the smallest trunk carrier."
Finally, past CAB regulation has produced a form of competition between carriers which differs dramatically from the competitive practices of most other major industries. Restrictions on route
selection and pricing have largely prevented carrier management
from making the two major decisions made by most other businesses: what markets should we enter and how much should we
charge for our goods and services? As a result, these controls
severely limit a carrier's ability to determine its own profitability.
A study by William Fruhan contends that the CAB actually exercises more direct control over a carrier's competitive position and
relative profitability than management does." With pricing removed as a competitive tool, the carriers have been forced to compete in terms of scheduling and inilight amenities, such as meals,
movies, and onboard pubs.
Previous Attempts at Deregulation
Although deregulation of the industry had never been seriously
considered by Congress until three years ago, the problems resulting from the system under the 1938 Act have been discussed since
the Truman Administration. A study by Lucille Keyes in 1951
concluded that there was no available evidence of any need, or
valid argument, for federal control over entry, or for government
protection of individual carrier revenues.' She was later to write
that protective regulation was no more essential to assure "the
provision of an adequate supply of air transport services.., than
it is necessary to secure an adequate supply of soaps, doorknobs,
or automobiles.""
3' REPORT OF THE CAB SPECIAL STAFF, supra note 22, at 102-04.
2
3 W. FRUHAN, THE FIGHT FOR A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 51-67 (1972).
Fruhan identifies nine specific profit variables in the industry: (1) the degree of
competition on the carrier's routes; (2) the distribution of haul lengths on the
carrier's routes; (3) the density distribution of passenger traffic on the carrier's
routes; (4) the reasonality of traffic flows on the carrier's routes; (5) the yields
(by haul length segments) received by the carrier; (6) the intensity (in hours
per day) of productive aircraft utilization; (7) the quality (or passenger appeal)
of the carrier's equipment; (8) the carrier's capacity aggressiveness in trying to
seize market share; and (9) the overall quality of carrier management. His study
concluded that the CAB controls the first five, leaving management with authority only over the last four variables.
I KEYES, supra note 4.
"4Keyes, A Reconsideration of Federal Control of Entry into Air Transportation, 22 J. AIR L. & COM. 192, 197 (1955).
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Suggestions, however, for relaxing controls on entry have always
brought a strong protest from the industry. During the course of
the fight by the "nonskeds" to obtain scheduled authority during
the early Fifties, two officers of the Air Transport Association predicted doom if the Board were to open the industry to outsiders:
On the day that concept was introduced, every airline would
tear up its time tables, disregard its certificates, forget that it has
franchise responsibilities and do what business it pleased in the interest of greater profits and not public convenience. Airlines who
had filed applications for particular routes would just start flying
those routes and not wait Board action. Carriers who had sought
for years to eliminate restrictions would just fly over the cities to
which they have been restricted. The industry, in such a chaotic
struggle for survival, would then have to abandon service to roughly some 500 of the cities to which it is now certificated, and operate only between the 50 most profitable pairs of points.
Acceptance of the "freedom of entry" thesis expounded in pending applications before the Civil Aeronautics Board would be tantamount to urging the creation of one or a number of new systems, draining the rich juice of the air transport network from
trunkline carriers who would be forced to continue to serve thin
segments. This would create an extremely unfair and uneconomic
competitive situation and would dislocate the country's air transport network. It would not represent any new or additional competitive opportunity, reflecting itself in public good, but only a
chance for a favored few really to enjoy excessive profits.'
Such prophecies have always seemed to carry the day. The
Board was severely criticized by several Congressional committees
during the Eisenhower years for its treatment of nonscheduled
carriers,' and executive recommendations to Presidents Kennedy
and Nixon proposed either reorganizing or abolishing the CAB."
But until Congress enacted legislation last November deregulating
the all-cargo industry,' not one of the more than thirty amendments
I Tipton and Gerwirtz, The Effect of Regulated Competition on the Air
Transport Industry, 22 J. Am L. & COM. 157, 190-191 (1955).
' See Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries (Airlines), Hearings before
Antitrust Subcomm. of House Judiciary Comm., 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
"'See
(1960);

LANDIS,

REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

PRESIDENT'S

COMMITTEE),

A

ADVISORY

COUNCIL

ON

EXECUTIVE

NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK:

ORGANIZATION

(ASH

REPORT ON SELECTED INDE-

(1971).
" Act of Nov. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-163. The act amends the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 by adding a new section 418 requiring the Board to award
PENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES
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to the economic provisions of the Federal Aviation Act has manifested any congressional intent to loosen restrictions on entry and

pricing.
The Impetus for Regulatory Change
What then are the reasons for the present drive to reform the
CAB's authority? There are several. First, there has been a growing public reaction against regulation of all kinds, manifested by
sunset legislation, hostility against such agencies as the FDA and
OSHA, and disgust at the debacle which the ICC has made of
the railroads. The economic recession, during the Nixon and Ford
administrations, and persistent problems with inflation have also
created public concern over the enormous costs of government
regulation.
Second, Congress and the public have become aware of the performance of intrastate airlines in Texas and California whose
operations are beyond the jurisdiction of the CAB. Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) and Air California (both certificated by the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and Southwest Airlines (certified by the Texas Aeronautics Commission (TAC))
charges fares substantially below the interstate fares historically
charged by CAB carriers in the identical, as well as comparable citypair markets, while still maintaining reasonable profits, high levels
of service, and excellent safety records. Their fares average twothirds, or less, of interstate fares for comparable distances, yet they
offer a large number of flights in short-haul density markets, using
modem 727 and 737 jet equipment. High load factors and efficient
operating practices have resulted in productivity more than double
that of some interstate carriers. Studies have shown that "they are
grandfather rights to any certificated carrier which provided scheduled interstate
all-cargo service within the continental United States sometime during the period
between January 1 and November 9, 1977; commuter carriers must have operated continuously during the 12-month period preceding November 9, 1977, to
qualify for grandfather rights. Thereafter, the Board is required to award allcargo certificates to any applicant who demonstrates that it is fit, willing, and
able to provide the proposed service, and no certificate may contain restrictions
limiting the points to be served or the rates to be charged. In addition, the bill
amends section 1002 of the Act to limit the Board's authority to regulate cargo
rates to those cases where the Board finds, after notice and hearing, that the
rates are discriminatory, preferential, prejudicial, or predatory. In general, allcargo transportation involving the states of Hawaii and Alaska will continue to
be regulated under existing law. The Board is permitted to exempt holders of
all-cargo certificates from any section of the Act.
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carrying almost twice as many revenue ton-miles per employee and
boarding 1.7 and 2.2 times as many passengers per employee as the
average short-haul [CAB] carrier."39
Much of this success-and the resulting benefits to the public
-has been due to the regulatory environment in which these airlines have operated. PSA inaugurated service during a period in
which there was complete freedom of entry and pricing in California. ' For nearly two decades PSA and a number of other airlines freely entered intrastate markets, offering low fares and
building the Los Angeles-San Francisco corridor into the most
heavily traveled air market in the world. The low fares which prevailed in California required carriers to minimize their costs; many
carriers could not do so, but, because of its high productivity,
PSA succeeded-offering frequent service and earning excellent
profits. But like the mail contract carriers in 1938, PSA believed
it could preserve its market position more effectively in a regulated
environment. In 1965, apparently at its behest, the California legislature granted the CPUC authority to control airline entry and
exit."1 Since that time California regulation has become as restrictive as federal regulation. Air California began operations in
1967 under a certificate authorizing service from Santa Anna to
the Bay Area, but in 1967 the CPUC refused to certificate another
new carrier, Pacific Air Transport, to provide service between
Long Beach and San Francisco, on the grounds that it had failed
to make a satisfactory showing of financial stability or experience
in scheduled operations. In the last twelve years, the CPUC has
also clearly sheltered Air California from direct competition by
PSA, refusing to permit the two carriers to compete against one
another from the same airports except in several minor markets. '
The Texas regulatory statute also has its deficiencies, ' most of
which the Texas Aeronautics Commission has wisely surmounted
39 SIMAT,

AIR

HELLIESEN AND

EICHNER,

INC., AN

ANALYSIS

CARRIER REGULATORY FORUM, SUMMARY REPORT

as SIMAT, HELLIESEN AND EICHNER, INC.].

OF THE

23 (1976)

INTRASTATE

[hereinafter cited

40See generally W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATTON IN AMERICA (1970) [hereinafter cited as JORDAN]; and Comment, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air
Transportation and National Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L. J. 1415 (1965).
41 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2750-2769 (West 1975).
SLaMond, An Evaluation of Intrastate Airline Regulation in California, 7
BELL J. ECON. & MGT. Sci. 641 (1976).
4 For an analysis of the TAC, see Means & Chasnoff, State Regulation of Air
Transportation: The Texas Aeronautics Commission, 53 TEx. L. REV. 653 (1975).
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through implementation at the Commission level of liberal entry
and pricing policies. The success achieved by Southwest Airlines
under these entry and pricing policies provides the primary current example and impetus for federal reform. The Texas Aeronautics Act itself, however, requires potential new entrants to
obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity and requires
the TAC, before granting intrastate authority, to consider "the
effect, if any, upon existing air carriers and CAB certificated carriers." As a result of vigorous opposition by Braniff and Texas
International, the authorization of Southwest's new routes in the
state has required lengthy administrative proceedings and court
appearances. On the other hand, the TAC has fought to maintain
Southwest's right to use close-in airports and has allowed it considerable pricing flexibility and experimentation. The latter has
led to the development of a unique two-tier, peak-offpeak pricing
structure which has produced the lowest generally available offpeak fares in the country for scheduled short-haul airline service. '
Although neither the California nor Texas statutes are perfect
models for regulatory reform, both states, at different times, have
allowed the creation and growth of low fare service not possible
under the prior federal regulatory regime. The CPUC and TAC
have given their carriers the flexibility to pursue pricing strategies
which dramatically increased traffic and resulted in profitable,
efficient systems in a highly competitive environment. Most important, their low fares and high productivity have furnished excellent examples of the benefits which could be achieved by a lessregulated industry.
A third factor which has contributed to the current impetus for
reform of the 1958 Act is the nearly unanimous opinion of economists that CAB regulation results in greater technical inefficiency
and higher fares than would exist if restraints were removed.
Using intrastate fares as a model, studies have demonstrated that
in the absence of federal regulation airline fares would be forty to
eighty percent lower than those actually charged in major domestic
markets." Without regulation, the passenger also would be afforded
" TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46c-6,

§ 3(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).

supra note 39, at 6.
supra note 40, at 100-114; Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market
Performance, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. Sci. 399 (1972); and G. DOUGLAS and
4 SIMAT, HELLIESEN AND EICHNER, INC.,
' JORDAN,
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greater variety in the range of prices and services offered in particular markets. Moreover, it is contemplated that the efficiency of
the industry would improve as a result of higher load factors, more
sensible route alignment, and carrier specialization.
In 1975, the Board itself appointed a special staff to undertake
a comprehensive study of air transport controls and proposals for
regulatory reform. The staff returned to the Board recommending
that all protective entry and public utility-type price controls in
domestic air transportation be eliminated within three to five years
by amendment to the Federal Aviation Act.' According to the
Special Staff, such controls
are not justified by the underlying cost and demand characteristics
of commercial air transportation. The industry is naturally competitive, not monopolistic. In the absence of economic regulation,
it is clear that monopoly abuses would not occur. Service quality
and price would be highly responsive to demand because of the
immediate threat of new entry even in markets served by a single
carrier. Most important for the long term, the possibility of new
entry will assure that the system will be composed of highly efficient carriers able to adapt readily to changing conditions.
The present system of regulation causes higher than necessary
costs and prices (which in turn suppress demand), weakens the
ability of carriers to respond to market demand and other constantly changing conditions, narrows the range of price/quality
choices to the user, and thus produces a misallocation of the nation's economic resources."
The conclusions reached by these studies have been reinforced
by the CAB's past inability to cope with the growing economic
problems in the industry-a fourth influence in the drive for
regulatory change. During the first half of the 1970's, airline profits
all but disappeared; at the same time the industry was faced with
enormous commitments for new flight equipment. Yet as profits
plummeted and the CAB struggled to adjust to changes in industry
costs and market conditions, external capital to finance new equipment all but dried up. Investors began to realize that the airlines,
once one of the glamour industries of the stock market, were now
J. MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT 172
47 REPORT OF THE CAB SPECIAL STAFF, supra note 22.
41 CAB SPECIAL STAFF, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF REPORT OF THE
CIAL STAFF ON REGULATORY REFORM 1 (July 22, 1975).

(1974).
CAB SPE-
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very poor investments. In fact, during the period from 1964 to
1974 investors in the air transport industry earned lower returns
and accepted greater risks than did investors in almost any other
industry. 9 With profits low and fares high, what did economic
regulation have to commend it?
The final important factor spurring the reform movement was
the reaction against certain policies pursued by the Board during
the Nixon Administration: in particular, its route moratorium;
capacity reduction: and pricing policies. Concerned with what it
considered to be overcapacity and excessive competition in the
industry, the CAB informally decided to refuse to award any new
route authority during the years 1969-1974.* This "route moratorium" was accomplished by delaying decisions in pending route
cases for years and refusing to set down new applications for a
hearing. Applications were seldom denied on their merits and the
policy was never formally adopted in accordance with the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, so that it
became effectively impossible for a carrier or other affected party
to seek judicial review of the moratorium."
The Board was also criticized for another policy it used in an
attempt to deal with the industry's financial problems: its approval
of agreements between airlines to reduce schedules in several transcontinental markets. Between 1971 and 1975, the Board sanctioned a number of these capacity reduction agreements between the
Big Four, despite their blatantly anti-competitive character. Several
of the temporary agreements were sustained by the courts on
'9 Gritta, Profitability and Risk

in Air Transport, 7 TRANSP. L. J. 197 (1975).
590
Report on Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures, Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. 77-102 (1975).
9t
See, e.g., Utah Agencies v. CAB, 504 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1974), holding
that refusal to grant an immediate or expedited hearing on a request for competitive service between Los Angeles and Salt Lake City was not an abuse of discretion. The Board had less success when it attempted to dismiss such applications on their merits. In 1974, it refused to grant competitive authority in the
Denver-San Diego market saying that while additional authority was perhaps
justified, the industry's financial difficulties and the fuel shortage overrode the

benefits of competition. On appeal, the Board was reversed on the grounds its
decision conflicted with the mandate to promote competition contained in the
Act. Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 519 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The
deliberate delay used to effectuate the "moratorium" was, of course, a designed
accentuation of the normal and endemic regulatory "lag," which constitutes yet
another spur for CAB reform in the procedural area.
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appeal," but in 1975 a more permanent agreement was found
illegal because of the Board's refusal to consider its antitrust
implications."
The Board's pricing policies also generated considerable concern. In 1970, it initiated a massive public investigation of the
domestic passenger fare structure, apparently in response to criticism of its prior policy of establishing fares through closed meetings with carrier representatives. The decisions in the nine phases
of that investigation have resulted in the setting of standard seating
configurations, imposition of uniform rates (between city pairs
of equal distance) on the basis of average industry costs, disapproval of many discount fares, a requirement that fares be based
on fully allocated costs, a maximum discount for economy from
coach fares, and the refusal to permit individual carriers to raise
or lower fares within a "zone of reasonableness." Although the
Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation (DPFI) may have represented an improvement over the manner in which the Board had
earlier set fares, it also introduced much more rigidity into the fare
structure than was necessary under the Act. Use of industry average costs, for example, dampens the incentive of an individual carrier to improve its efficiency. By insisting that airlines charge uniform rates, based on a "cost-related" fare taper (the shorter the
distance the higher the yield per mile), the Board has substantially
raised the price of short-haul travel above the level at which it is
competitive with surface modes of transportation; and it has effectively prevented individual carriers from experimenting with selective price cutting in particular markets. As pointed out by the
CAB Special Staff, "the logic of DPFI requires that the rate regulation be made more restrictive to protect the carriers from themselves and the public from the effects of carrier extravagance. " "
5

E.g., Air Line Pilots Association International v. CAB, 475 F.2d 900 (D.C.

Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975).
'aUnited States v. CAB, 511 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
For analyses of the DPFI see REPORT OF THE CAB SPECIAL STAFF, supra
note 22, at 62-76; Douglas and Miller, The CAB's Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. Sci. 205 (1974). See also Continental Air
Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 522 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and Continental Air Lines,
Inc. v. CAB, 551 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The present CAB is eliminating
these artificial and anti-competitive pricing constraints. CAB Regulation PS-80,
Amendment No. 59 to Part 399, Dockets 31290 & 30891 (August 25, 1978).
"5REPORT OF THE CAB SPECIAL STAFF, supra note 22, at 74.
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These various factors-hostility to excessive government regulation, the example of intrastate carriers, economic studies of the
airline industry, carrier financial problems, and reaction against
previous Board policies-have merged during the last three years
to provide bipartisan support for regulatory change. The hearings
by Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure were key to generating this support.' Various other
congressional committees, the Ford and Carter administrations,
and the CAB itself have each recommended substantial revisions
to the Act. In October 1975, President Ford sent to Congress a
comprehensive program of reform, entitled the Aviation Act of
1975, which was designed to allow greater pricing flexibility and
freedom of entry." During the next two years, a number of other
reform bills were introduced by various Congressmen. 8 As this is
being updated, the Senate and House are about to convene a conference committee on their differing versions of regulatory reform,
S. 2493 and H.R. 12611. 9
Under the leadership of Chairman Alfred Kahn, the Board itself has begun to ease pricing and entry restrictions within the
framework of the existing Act. It has approved discount fare
proposals submitted by individual carriers, such as "Peanuts" and
"Super Saver" fares, and it has reworked the Domestic Passenger
Fare Investigation so as to liberalize many of the more stringent
DPFI findings which restricted individual carrier pricing flexibility." Moreover, the Board has recently announced that as a
matter of general policy it will now consider the offer of (or failure to offer) low fares as a major factor in all future route proceedings. In determining the need for new authority and the choice
of a carrier to serve the market, the Board stated that it will consider proposals for new price options (reduced normal fares, promotional fares, and off-peak pricing), and service options (reduced
6 See note 21 supra.
5 S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
"8E.g., S. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 3536, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976); S. 3830, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
5"95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The Senate bill is a product of committee

hearings on the Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act of 1977, S. 689, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), introduced by Senators Cannon and Kennedy, and the
Commercial Aviation Regulatory Reform Act of 1977, S. 292, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977), introduced by Senators Pearson and Baker.
"See note 54 supra.

19781

DEREGULATION

amenities, improved aircraft utilization, higher density seating,
and load factors)." In addition, the CAB has already set for
expedited hearing, or decided favorably, a number of applications
for low-fare route authority by proposed new entrants, such as
intrastate carriers, supplemental carriers, and companies not presently operating airline service, and has adopted a policy of granting all applicants permissive, rather than mandatory authority to
serve."2 The members of the Board, however, recognize that by
attempting to encourage competition, lessen entry barriers, and
promote low fares, they may be taking "calculated legal risks" involving possible reversal of the Board's actions as contrary to the
mandates of the present Act. They have pleaded with Congress
to enact regulatory reform legislation that will emphasize competition and eliminate ambiguity and conflict in policy goals; produce
procedural expedition; and grant greater flexibility in the areas of
ratemaking and exemption from the Act's requirements."
Although the Senate and House reform proposals now proceeding to conference committee are by no means uniform, the legislation under consideration would basically do the following:
(a) amend the policy declaration in Section 102 to place greater
emphasis on competition, efficient and low-cost transportation,
entry by new carriers, and prevention of undue concentration in
the industry;
(b) redefine standards for obtaining new route authority by ultimately requiring opponents to prove that proposed service is inconsistent with the public convenience and necessity;
(c) provide a vehicle for automatic entry by which existing CAB
carriers and large intrastate carriers could initiate non-stop service
in one or two markets of their choice each year;
(d) allow automatic exit from markets without the necessity to
obtain Board approval;
(e) create a new class of federally-subsidized carriers using
Competitive Service Investigation, CAB
01 Chicago-Albany/Syracuse-Boston
9, 1977).
Order
No.
77-12-50
at
3
(Dec.
"2 E.g., Chicago Midway Low-Fare Route Proceeding (CAB Docket 30,277);
California-Nevada Low-Fare Route Proceeding (CAB Docket 30,659); and the
Transcontinental Low-Fare Route Proceeding (CAB Docket 30,536).
"AVIATION DAILY, February 9, 1978, at 220; AVIATION DAILY, February 10,
1978, at 228.
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thirty-fifty seat aircraft to provide service to small communities;
(f) allow carriers the freedom to raise or lower fares within a
zone of reasonableness without Board approval;
(g) open the charter industry to any applicant the Board determined was fit, willing, and able;
(h) remove regulation of charter fares;
(i) deprive the Board of its power to approve and immunize
from the antitrust laws certain capacity reduction, pooling, or farefixing agreements between carriers;
(j) impose procedural time limits on Board actions to reduce
regulatory lag and prevent the Board from sitting on applications
for new service; direct the Board to streamline its hearing process
and make greater use of show cause proceedings; and
(k) preempt state regulation of carriers operating under a CAB
license (except, possibly, large intrastate carriers).
What are the major arguments for and against such legislation?
The Arguments for Regulatory Reform
The proponents of regulatory reform"' argue that air transportation is as naturally competitive as any other industry and should
not be subject to public utility regulation; high variable costs,
rather than the high fixed costs associated with public utilities,
characterize the industry. Restrictions on pricing flexibility have
eliminated beneficial competition, causing carriers to compete
largely with increased flight schedules. This has resulted in excess
equipment capacity, has led to unnecessarily high costs and passenger fares, and has driven down carrier profits. Restrictions on entry
by new carriers have insulated the industry from normal economic
pressures to reduce costs and improve productivity and have deprived the public of low fares and new, innovative services. In addition, say the proponents, controls on entry and exit have encouraged inefficient route structures and fostered undesirable attempts
to cross subsidized low density routes with profits from high density
markets. For example, there is no sound reason to force people
traveling between New York and Chicago to subsidize passengers
04 See generally Snow, Aviation Regulation: A Time for Change, 41 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 637 (1975); Miller, A Perspective on Airline Regulatory Reform, 41

J.

AIR

L. & COM. 679 (1975); Levine, Alternatives to Regulation: Competition

in Air Transportation and the Aviation Act of 1976, 41 J.

(1975).

AIR

L. & COM. 703

1978]

DEREGULATION

traveling between Dubuque and Des Moines. If it costs more to
provide adequate service to small cities, then travelers actually using that service should pay for it.
The paramount goals: of CAB regulation should be to encourage
efficiency and competition within the industry. Relaxation of entry
restrictions would lead to new service and price options being
offered to the public, would promote carrier specialization in
services and haul lengths, and would force incumbent airlines to
reduce costs. Because, above a certain level, there are no significant
economies of scale in the industry, a less-regulated industry would
consist of many small carriers rather than several large ones;
therefore, concentration would diminish. Classic rate-making principles should be rejected in favor of allowing prices to be established by market forces. Competition between carriers then would
lead to a reduction in fares in dense markets and more attractive
choices being offered the price-sensitive traveler. As the public responded to lower fares, load factors would increase and equipment
utilization would improve.
The Arguments Against Regulatory Reform
The opponents of regulatory reform include not only many
scheduled CAB carriers, but also airline labor, holders of airline
debt, and some airport operators. Their principal arguments!5
against amending the Act may be summarized as follows:
Economic regulation under the 1938 act has produced the finest
air transportation system in the world, with rates significantly lower
than those for comparable service in any other country. Airline
fares have increased much less than the cost of other goods and
services, and are cost-related. Fares must be set on a system-wide
basis to permit cross-subsidization of weak routes, which would
not receive service in a free market; such service to small communities is critical to an adequate national transportation system.
The industry is presently highly competitive-if anything, too
5 See generally Tillinghast, The Practicalities of "Deregulation," 45 ABA
ANTITRUST L. J. 236 (1976); Callison, Airline Deregulation-A Hoax?, 41 J.

AIR L. & COM. 747 (1975); Brenner, Need for Continued Economic Regulation
of Air Transport, 41 J. Am L. & COM. 793 (1975); Lloyd-Jones, Deregulation

and Its Potential Effect on Airline Operations, 41 J. Am L. & CoM. 815 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Lloyd-Jones]; and Rasenberger, Deregulation and Local Airline Service-An Assessment of Risks, 41 J. Am L. & CoM. 843 (1975) [herein-

after cited as Rasenberger].
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much so. Dense markets are served by as many as three or four
carriers with excellent service levels and numerous flights throughout the day. Moreover, it is not a closed system. There has been
substantial new entry by local service (regional) airlines, charter
operators, and commuter carriers, and the Board has continually
increased competition with new route awards.
It is illogical to expect pricing variety in a deregulated environment because carriers would be forced to match every fare decrease made by a competitor. Since airlines offer a substantially
identical product, no airline could afford to concede the marketing
advantage created by even a minor fare reduction. Large carriers
would simply use low fares as a predatory tactic to increase their
market share and drive competitors from routes. The result would
be mass bankruptcy for weaker or smaller airlines and even greater
concentration in the industry. In addition, because of the resulting
financial uncertainty, banks and insurance companies would refuse
to lend to airlines, depriving them of needed capital to finance new
equipment purchases.
If carriers were free to enter and exit markets at will, many
marginal markets would lose certificated service entirely, either
depriving isolated communities of access to the airline network or
else forcing the government to replace such service through offering greater direct subsidies. The simple result of the entire concept
of regulatory reform would be chaos and instability, loss of jobs,
widespread carrier failure, dog-eat-dog competition, carrier refusal
to finance new airport construction, a degradation in safety, and a
loss in consumer confidence in the entire industry.
The Consequences of the Proposed Legislation
The opponents of deregulation obviously paint a very gloomy
picture of a "deregulated" future. For many airline managers, strict
economic regulation has become a narcotic. Even the thought of
reducing the dose or switching to methadone sends them into cold
sweats. Simple resistance to change from the familiar accounts for
much of the opposition to loosening the reins on the industry.
Most of the arguments advanced by the opponents of regulatory
reform are simply echoes of the rationale advanced by their predecessors for adoption of the original Act, and are neither intellectually convincing nor borne out by the experience of intrastate
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operations under more liberal entry and pricing policies. The logic
behind some is predicated on an assumption "that airline managements would act irrationally by foregoing profitable operations in
small markets and engaging in loss operations in large markets to
the point of bankruptcy-a view contradicted by general business
experience and empirical evidence in the field of air transporta-

tion." 0
There undoubtedly would be some "shake-out" or adjustment
period, but the results should not be traumatic. The gradual relaxation of entry controls provided for in most reform proposals would
minimize almost all conceivable dislocations. Through trial and
error and greater reliance on simple supply and demand, the system would move toward the equilibriums experienced by any other
major industry. The end result would undoubtedly be lower fares,
increased volumes of traffic, and improved carrier profits. Any discontinuance of small community service by large carriers would
be redressed quickly by commuter carriers at every point where it
is economically justified; present commuter operations prove this.
Unfortunately we have few actual examples of the effects of
deregulating an industry. Australia and England, however, each
has eliminated regulation of its trucking industry, and in neither
case has there been the chaos, destructive competition, or the
financial instability which had been predicted beforehand." Although the profits of individual airlines would not be guaranteed,
it is doubted that any present air carrier would be forced into
bankruptcy. For example, competition in Texas during the last six
years has forced one carrier to improve its productivity and reorient
its management philosophy, inducing it to offer an innovative program of traffic-generating low fares over most of its interstate routes;
in the process it has moved from the brink of insolvency to earning
healthy profits.
Under an amended statute, the Board will be under both stautory
and political pressure to certificate new carriers, in addition to
granting new route authority to CAB and large intrastate carriers.
It has been suggested that there will be a stampede by inexperienced
THE CAB SPECIAL STAFF, supra note 22, at 170 n. 1.
Unregulated Road Haulage: The Australian Experience, 16 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 275 (1964), cited in Demory, Deregulation, The Adjustment Process, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 873, 882-883 (1975).
66 REPORT OF
67Joy,
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operators to form companies and apply for new route authority
since "there is an allure to running an airline that seems to drive
otherwise sensible people toward economic self destruction.""
Economic realities mitigate against such a result. Start-up costs for
Southwest Airlines' initial operations in 1971, including three new
jet aircraft operating between only three cities, required a total
investment of $20 million. The CAB Special Staff estimated that
entry into transcontinental markets with new wide-bodied equipment would require as much as $150 million, although start-up costs
could be reduced significantly by leasing equipment or purchasing
used aircraft." No investor or lender would commit millions of
dollars in funds to such a project unless he were convinced that
the applicant's management was experienced and totally competent
and that the business stood a reasonable chance of success. Moreover, the Board could not certificate such a carrier under any of
the reform proposals unless it first found it "fit, willing, and able.WO
The economic implications obviously dominate discussions of
regulatory reform. Yet there are other, less publicized issues which
may be of practical or philosophical interest to practicing lawyers
not directly involved in this controversy. They include the consequences for airline safety, airport financing and construction, consumer protection, and administrative law and procedure.
Airline Safety. One of the concerns most often voiced about easing restrictions on entry into the airline industry involves the maintenance of adequate safety standards. Will there be an influx of under-capitalized "scarf and goggles" operators whose marginal profits will force them to compromise on maintenance and flight standards? Although it is believed this fear is totally unfounded,
there is some superficial basis for concern. William Jordan, in his
study of the California industry, found that during the 1949
through 1965 period of open entry in California intrastate carriers
did have a higher rate of passenger fatalities than the CAB regulated industry. He concludes, however, that the smaller volume of
traffic for the California carriers probably makes it improper to
compare the two fatality rates.' Studies of the air taxi industry
61 Rasenberger, supra note 65, at 857.
OF CAB SPECIAL STAFF, supra note 22, at 109.
70S. 2493 & H.R. 12611, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
71JoRAN, supra note 40, at 49-53. He also concludes, however, that the corn-
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in recent years have also purported to disclose a correlation between a carrier's financial condition and the level of safety at which
it operates. If profits were marginal and management was inexperienced, some air taxi operators apparently scrimped on their expenses, resulting in substandard maintenance and operating procedures."
Admittedly, expenditures to preserve high maintenance and flight
standards impose significant economic burdens on a carrier, but
it is doubted sufficient evidence exists to establish whether safety
depends on economic stability rather than direct safety controls.
Even if financial stability were the paramount consideration, however, the restrictions on entry and pricing imposed by the present
Act are still not justified. Under the deregulation proposals pending
before Congress, financial fitness and ability remain a prerequisite
to entry into the industry and the CAB is still required to promote
safety in air commerce as one of its policy objectives. Before the
Board may certificate a new carrier or exempt it from the provisions of the Act, the applicant must demonstrate that it is fit,
willing, and able to provide the proposed service. Economic regulation of routes or fare levels does not effect safety. In the pharmaceutical and meat processing industries, for example, the government closely regulates product safety, yet makes no attempt to
regulate who enters the market or what prices they will charge for
their goods. The opponents of regulatory reform have made no
adequate showing why the air transport industry should be treated
differently.
In addition, airline safety is regulated by the FAA, not the
CAB, and the responsibility and functions of the FAA are in no
way affected by the regulatory reform proposal. All carriers operating under Part 121 (commercial operators utilizing heavy aircraft) of the Federal Aviation Regulations, such as PSA, Air Cal,
Southwest Airlines, and the CAB's trunk and regional carriers,
must comply with the same safety standards, regardless of whether
they are certificated by the CAB or not. The air taxi operators are
plete absence of fatal accidents by PSA during 16 years of unregulated operations
demonstrated that economic regulation is not a necessary condition for airline
safety.
7

2 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, AIR TAXI SAFETY STUDY, RENo. NTSB-AAS-72-9, September 1972; ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGAT-

PORT

ING COMMISSION, INTRASTATE AnR OPERATIONS IN ILLINOIS, July, 1972.
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already exempt from CAB certification and their safety is regulated
under Part 135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. If safety regulation over the third level carriers is considered inadequate, then
the FAA can impose stricter requirements.
The experience of large intrastate carriers provides the best evidence that safety will not deteriorate under deregulation. Before
initiating operations in Texas in 1971, Southwest hired experienced
personnel drawn from major airlines to staff its flight maintenance
and ground operations. It based its operating manuals on those of
major carriers and subcontracted for such functions as pilot training and engine overhaul with such carriers as United and TWA.
The FAA would never have certificated Southwest unless it had
been fully satisfied that it had the financial resources to maintain
a safe operation and that its procedures fully complied with Federal
Aviation Regulations. In the interim, the FAA has continually
monitored, audited, and inspected Southwest's operations, assigning two inspectors to observe its maintenance and flight standards
on a full-time basis. In its six year history, Southwest has carried
more than five million passengers, operated more than 1.5 billion
revenue passenger miles, made more than 100,000 takeoffs and
landings, and flown its equipment more than twenty-four million
plane miles without a single safety incident of any significance."'
Furthermore, no new entrant could expect to obtain consumer
acceptance of its services in competition with experienced carriers
unless its operations were of the highest caliber. Any accident involving aircraft flown by a young company would drive potential
passengers away. And any suggestion that an airline manager
would purposely endanger his passengers and own personnel by
adopting unsatisfactory safety standards is simply unthinkable.
Finally, as administrative scrutiny of "public convenience and
necessity" recedes, the lawyers for incumbent carriers may be expected to rush to fill the vacuum with prodigious: and prolonged
contentions as to the fitness of new applicants.
Airport Financing and Construction. Regulatory reform has
been opposed by some airport operators on the grounds that it
would undermine the stability of the financial arrangements be73 Airline Deregulation and Safety Hearing, Government Activities and Transportation Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) (Testimony of M. Lamar Muse).
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tween airlines and airport authorities. A substantial portion of
recent airport construction has been funded with revenue bonds
underwritten by long-term financial guarantees made by the carriers serving the airport. Opponents of regulatory reform claim
that because freer entry and pricing will force mass market abandonment and carrier bankruptcies, existing guarantees will be
destroyed and future airport financing will be impossible. According to the senior vice president of one major carrier, "No longer
will [the airlines] be willing to invest enormous sums in airport
improvement, ticket counters, passenger facilities, and the like
when the state of the industry is so uncertain under the conditions
of deregulation."'
These arguments are predicated upon several faulty assumptions.
The first is that regulatory reform will result in massive dislocations
in the industry-an assumption that is unsupported by any independent economic analysis" of the effects of freer entry and pricing
and which seems to be simply a component of the self-serving
rhetoric which the industry has used for forty years to justify strict
controls. The second premise, even less intellectually valid than
the first, pervades every discussion of the reform issue: the premise
that airline management is either insulated from, or unaffected by,
the normal business principles which influence decisions by every
other enterprise in this country. In the words of John W. Snow,
former Deputy Under Secretary of Transportation:
The contention that a lessening of economic controls will result
in erratic service reflects a lack of perspective or unfamiliarity with
unregulated markets. Most industries are not regulated, yet they
provide stable and dependable service at known prices. They do so
because it is in their self-interests to supply orderly and dependable service. A direct comparison also can be made with intrastate
airlines and airport concession holders. They are not regulated by
the board and they make long-run commitments for airport facilities."'
74Lloyd-Jones, supra note 65, at 824.
7 See e.g., Simat, Helliesen and Eichner, Inc., The Effects of Route Restriction
Removal and Discretionary Authority, REGULATION OF PASSENGER FARES AND
COMPETITION AMONG THE AIRLINES 169 (MacAvoy and Snow ed. 1977).
" Snow, The Problems of Airline Regulation and the Ford Administration
Proposal for Reform, REGULATION OF PASSENGER FARES
AMONG THE AIRLINES 3, 36 (MacAvoy and Snow ed. 1977).
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A retail business which has spent years building goodwill for itself
in a community does not pack up and move in the middle of the
night simply because a department store moves in next door or
one of its competitors lowers its prices. If it did, it would still face
rental payments on the building it has leased, as vacating premises
does not vacate liability. Why then is it assumed that greater competition will induce an airline-which has spent thousands of dollars to promote market identity at a city-to suddenly cease service, leaving behind a fifteen-year airport lease under which it is
still financially obligated?
Moreover, why must airport financing be guaranteed by the
airlines? It is recognized that such arrangements are advantageous
for city fathers, but government authorities finance thousands of
highways, college dormitories, and sewer projects every year
through general bond issues without requiring users to co-sign the
note. If the airlines were regarded more as simple customers of
an airport authority, it is suggested there would be much more
efficient use of existing facilities. As Michael Levine, newly appointed Director of the CAB's Bureau of Pricing & Domestic Aviation, has pointed out, one result of the current system "is that some
localities have been enabled to indulge in a penchant for monument-building by relying on the ability of airline guarantors to
generate the necessary revenues from CAB protected fares.'
These mammoth new facilities (Levine cites Dallas-Fort Worth
Airport as the most "striking example of this phenomenon") have
been located away from population centers, reducing the attractiveness of short-haul service, and often have a capital investment
several times that justified by reasonably foreseeable levels of traffic.
If deregulation decreases the airlines' willingness to finance such
civic monuments and increases the incentive to improve present
facilities, then it has much to recommend it.
In addition, airport efficiency could be improved considerably
in an environment of freer entry and pricing. Airport managers
could follow the lead of intrastate carriers by using peak load
pricing in their landing fee schedules to encourage a more even
distribution of flights during the day. Congestion fees at major
hub airports would promote greater use of satellite, close-in, or
77Levine, Financial Implications of Regulatory Change in the Airline Industry, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 645, 652 (1976).
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other under-utilized facilities; the airlines could also ease the need
for new airports by increasing connections at smaller hubs instead
of channeling all their traffic through congested facilities such as
Atlanta and O'Hare as many do now. Terminal arrangements could
also be made more flexible so as to permit gates and boarding
lounges to be shifted easily from one carrier to another in response
to changes in schedules and traffic volume. As the airlines begin
to compete more on the basis of price and service options, they
will be less inclined to design their departure gates as elaborate
and luxurious marketing tools and more as realistic accommodations for expediting greater numbers of passengers. In summary,
new airport facilities and improvements wil continue to be built
in a less-regulated environment and may, as a result of competitive
market pressures, be less expensive and more efficient.
Consumer Protection. The services rendered by the airlines have
always received high marks with the public. Several recent public
opinion polls have rated the air transport industry among the
highest in the nation in terms of consumer approval of the quality
of service which it provides.' Regulatory reform will not diminish
that quality; the increased competition between carriers resulting
from freer entry will probably result in many improvements in the
way airlines treat their passengers. Yet, ironically, there is going
to be constant pressure on the Board to impose more "consumer
protection" controls, even as the industry experiments with price
and quality options in a deregulated environment.
The basic premise of deregulation is that market forces rather
than government controls provide the highest quality product to
the consumer. Yet some advocates of deregulation have trouble
accepting that premise fully. One of the foremost advocates of
freer entry and pricing in the airline industry is Ralph Nader's
Aviation Consumer Action Project (ACAP), a member of the
Ad Hoc Committee on Regulatory Reform. The ACAP supports
amending the 1958 Act on the grounds that it will result in lower
prices for the consumer. Yet ACAP has also been one of the most
persistent advocates of increased CAB supervision over industry
practices.
In 1972, the ACAP petitioned the CAB for a regulation which
7
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would impose penalties on carriers for failure to operate flights
within schedules printed on timetables and passenger tickets, arguing that many flight delays are caused not by safety factors or air-

port congestion, but by deceptive scheduling practices or employee
negligence. The CAB wisely dismissed the petition on the ground
that any regulation requiring scheduled airlines to operate according to published schedules would jeopardize airline safety." More
recently, the ACAP has urged the Board to insist on more stringent rules regarding overbooking, baggage mishandling, flight delays, lost tickets, overcharges, and fare-refund problems, and to

require airlines to settle passenger grievances by Board-imposed
arbitration." Such petitions are obviously predicated on the assumption that only law and government controls constrain a business firm from treating its customers unfairly, an assumption that
directly conflicts with the entire premise of deregulation.
No airline-regardless of its size or market share-can ignore
the fact that it sells products or services in competition with others.
If its flights are consistently late, if reservations are not honored,
or if it overcharges for its services, then its passengers will not be
back. While there is a need for outlawing fraudulent practices,
attempting to cover every conceivable aspect of carrier misconduct
by Board regulation not only runs counter to the purpose of regulatory reform, it is undesirable for a number of other important
reasons. It contributes to the overloading of the legal system, the
social disease former Stanford Law School Dean Bayless Manning
has called "hypelexis"-too much law." It imposes enormous
expense on the government in terms of enforcement and on the
carrier in terms of compliance (the latter ultimately reflected in
higher passenger fares). More important, it stifles carrier incentive to deal with consumer problems in an imaginative, innovative
way. Despite our current belief that legal institutions are the most
effective way to solve any problem, many instances of perceived
consumer mistreatment are simply better left unregulated for the
benefit of society as a whole.
There would appear to be, however, little hope that either conCAB Order No. 73-6-28 (June 8, 1973).
8 Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1978, at 33, col. 4.
81 See Manning, Too Much Law: Our National Disease, 33 Bus.
(1977).
7
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sumer groups or the Board itself will be able to resist the temptation to increase "consumer protection" regulation in a deregulated
environment. As Dean Manning has pointed out, there is a "rising
feeling among many members of the public today that the society
as a whole should in some way compensate the individual for
almost any loss he sustains," that we should be striving to create
"a riskless society.""2 In addition, the legal profession has gone to
substantial lengths to promote the notion that government regulation or a lawsuit should be used to rectify almost every instance of
undesirable conduct. Thus, simple economic disputes are transformed into battles between the just and the evil. Under freer
entry and pricing, there will exist a regulatory vacuum which the
Board has never experienced before. Since regulators usually have
a propensity to regulate, "consumer protection" unfortunately
seems an excellent target.
Administrative Law and Procedure. The regulatory reform bills
being debated by Congress contain provisions which run counter
to certain entrenched attitudes concerning transportation regulation
and administrative law in general. Lawyers steeped in these traditions may find the consequences discomforting.
This legislation is the first American attempt to loosen the restraints imposed on a regulated industry, although it may be the
forerunner of similar proposals to deregulate surface transportation
and the natural gas industry. Air transport regulation, long the
handmaiden of regulatory concepts developed for the railroads in
the nineteenth century, will now be governed by statutory policies
that are unfamiliar to the courts in the context of the industry.
No doubt many of the provisions of the Act will be litigated for
years until a clear interpretation emerges. Because the resulting
legislation will probably be a compromise between the advocates
of complete freedom of entry and pricing and the proponents of
the status quo, the final bill will possibly contain provisions inconsistent with the broad liberalization manifested in most of the
proposed new policy statements.
The Act will probably also contain terms which have never
played a significant role in transportation regulation. For example,
how will the Board and the courts define "efficiency"? Will this
92
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require the Board, as William Fruhan suggested several years ago,
to "rate" the quality of individual carrier managment?3 Will the
courts adopt an economist's definition of such terms or impose
one of their own, as they have with the term "price discrimination"? Are the lawyers who will dominate the resolution of these
issues (as legislators, CAB staff members, airline counsel, and, in
particular, appellate judges) equipped to deal with a regulatory
scheme dependent on economic theory rather than traditional
concepts of public convenience and necessity? Most of the issues
handled by the Board today, of course, involve questions of transportation economics--e.g., rate making, demand elasticity, and
traffic forecasts. Richard Posner, writing a decade ago about the
forces which have shaped the regulatory process, suggested there
may be problems in the transition:
A lawyer's training and experience are indispensible to the practical implementation of social policy. What is too readily assumed
is that lawyers are also expert in the underlying policies themselves, a view that lawyers, who are among the most facile of "generalists," eagerly promote. Unhappily, the overwhelming majority
of lawyers involved with regulation are largely ignorant of the
principles of economics. Most lawyers have had undergraduate
economics courses, yet my experience (and that of others) has
been that such courses generally fail to make a lasting impression
so far as aiding later insight into regulatory problems is concerned,
partly, perhaps, because the treatment of regulated industries in
economics textbooks tends to be bland and uncritical. Most law
schools do little to remedy this deficiency. A law student's exposure
to the regulated industries is normally limited to the administrative
law class, which deals with procedural questions, not with economic policies. What law schools principally instill in their students is
sensitivity to the formal processes of the law and to consideration
of fairness and equity, emphases that go far to explain the continuing preoccupation of both practicing lawyers and legal scholars
with the procedural and distributional questions in the regulatory
field-such as how much of the pie should investors get and how
much consumers. Issues as or more important to the welfare of
society-issues of economic efficiency in the broadest sense of the
term-are usually ignored because they are the province of a
different discipline. In this fashion, the compartmentalization of
Is FRUHAN,

supra note 32, at 137.
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scholarly and professional interest in regulatory problems has retarded an adequate understanding of those problems."
If regulatory reform is to work in practice, then the courts will
have to recognize and understand the economic theory on which
it is premised. No doubt the legislative history of the bill will be
consulted continuously, but it may be some time before legal practitioners and the courts feel comfortable with the statute.
Another feature of the proposed legislation which harbors unforeseen consequences is the section which would require the Board
to reduce regulatory lag and streamline its hearing processes. The
present delay in CAB decisions exists for a number of reasons.
Delays of only a few months can mean many thousands of dollars
in additional profits to an incumbent carrier while the route case
remains pending. Consequently, carriers often use a variety of
tactics to postpone a Board decision allowing competitors to enter
a market. For example, in 1973, National Airlines invoked the
National Environmental Policy Act to delay for almost three years
a final CAB decision which would end its monopoly in the lucrative Miami-Los Angeles market.' Thus, as former CAB Chairman
John Robson, a strong advocate of regulatory reform, has observed,
while "there are no more vocal critics of regulatory lag than regulatory litigators and their clients," the same individuals are the
most "skillful wielders of the levers of administrative delay when
expedition does not seem to be called for."'"
Actually the CAB is more efficient than many other administrative agencies because of its use of prehearing conferences and prior
exchange of testimony and exhibits. The proposed statutory mandate to further streamline its procedures and make greater use of
show cause procedings will force the Board to experiment with
new methods of administrative process; e.g., broader use of rule
making, policy pronouncements, exemptions, and the like. The
Board, for example, might attempt to use rule-making to establish
the need for new service in a market and then exclude that issue
"Posner, supra note 12, at 623-624.
85For an excellent discussion of this incident see Burger, Miami-Los Angeles
and NEPA: The Use of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 as an
Anticompetitive Weapon, 42 J. Am L. & COM. 529 (1976).
"Address by John E. Robson to the annual meeting of the ABA Section of
Public Utilities, Chicago, 111. (Aug. 10, 1977).
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from a subsequent adjudicatory hearing to decide which of several
competing applicants is to receive the authority. During the past
several years, practitioners and scholars of administrative law have
demanded greater and greater guarantees of procedural due process on almost every issue that comes before the government. Few
seem to realize that independent governmental agencies are fundamentally policy-making bodies and that exaggerated procedural
"due process" inevitably produces a denial of substantive due
process to one side of the docket or the other. If the Board can
devise methods to reduce regulatory lag and still satisfy the courts,
it may be making a significant contribution to the resolution of an
important issue in administrative law.

